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Ⅰ．Introduction
The number “2,022,333” is definitely a shocking one for most Japanese, and for the whole world as 
well.  The monthly average number of welfare recipients, for the first time in March 2011, has exceeded 
2 million since 1952.  The turning point came in the late 1990s.  The percentage of welfare recipients 
against the total population had been steadily declining until 1995 when the trend changed direction and 
the number has continued to rise drastically thereafter.  Along with Japan’s unprecedented speed of 
aging, the number of welfare claims has been growing exponentially: its size has doubled in just one 
decade (Figure 1). 
Although elderly households continue to be the predominant claimants of welfare, since the turn of 
the century, the number of working-age households requesting welfare has been growing at an 
unprecedented pace.  Between 2008 and 2009 alone, these households increased from 121,570 to 
171,978 (41.5% rise).  We embarked on the study with suspicion that this rapid increase of working-age 
households on welfare has been triggered not only by the economic downturn but also by the generous 
government stance on welfare approvals.
This paper investigates to what extent “temporary/business cycle shock” or “permanent/ structural 
shock” (aging and government stance) could explain the recent rapid rises in welfare figures.  If the 
temporary shock dominates, we can expect a moderate rise or even decline of welfare claims when the 
economy recovers.  On the contrary, if the permanent shock plays a central role, rises in welfare claims 
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are very likely caused by persistent transitions in population structure and welfare programs, and are 
hard to alleviate or reverse in a short run.
There have been very few empirical studies on this topic in Japan with the sole exception of Suzuki 
and Zhou (2007).  Using a bivariate vector autoregression method, which was originally implemented by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) in real business cycle analysis, Suzuki and Zhou (2007) try to separate out 
the effects of temporary shocks and permanent shocks on the rises of welfare claims.  Their study, for the 
first time, confirms the relative importance of permanent shock on the rises of welfare claims since 1992, 
but their analysis only traces until October 2006.  This paper, however, adds the most recent period 
(November 2006 to March 2011) into the analysis target, and aims to disclose whether permanent shock 
is still the major driving force for the rises of welfare claims in recent years, particularly for the years 
after the Lehman crisis. 
Our empirical findings indicate that permanent shock, as a whole, played a central role in driving up 
the welfare requests during the last two decades.  While Suzuki and Zhou (2007) find that temporary 
shock explains more than half of the public assistance rate variance at 0 to 60 months, this paper reveals 
that the permanent shock dominates even at the very initial time horizon.  A further look on the gap of 
forecasted and real values of the public assistance rate indicates that permanent shock plays a particularly 
important role in explaining the rapid rises of welfare claims since 2008.  Permanent shock accounts for 
only 52.0% of the gap between forecast and actual values (“forecast-real gap”) at the beginning of the 
Lehman shock, but its share reaches as high as 82.3% now. 
The expansion of the permanent shock was unsteady and was obviously interrupted between 2003 and 
2007, during which period there were strong public opinions expressed in Japan criticizing the overuse 
Figure 1　Number of households/persons on welfare (1990-2010)
Data source: “Welfare Administration Report” by Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
Notes: (1) Monthly averaged values.  (2) Forecasted values for 2010.
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of welfare.  As a result, stricter supervision on welfare approvals was instructed by the government.  In 
other words, the influence of permanent shock seems to be strengthened (or weakened) in parallel with 
the generosity (or toughness) of the government stance toward welfare approvals. 
In addition to the above, we found that the impact from temporary shock can last for a long time.  It 
takes 64 months for the impulse of temporary shock to converge to zero.  Put differently, even if the 
public assistance rate rises due to temporary shock such as a recession or an earthquake, it takes nearly 5 
years to regain the normal level. 
Ⅱ．Background
A．Sluggish Economy
Welfare recipients will definitely increase in a bad economy.  Japan’s economy has been suffering a 
near zero gross domestic product growth and persistent deflation for the entire period of the 1990s and 
2000s, which are termed the “lost decades”.  The pain of the “lost decades”, however, went 
disproportionally to young and unskilled workers. 
To fend off heavy competition from rival companies based overseas, most Japanese companies began 
to replace their permanent workforce with temporary workers who had no job security and fewer 
benefits, and these non-regular employees now make up over a third of Japan’s labor force.  Although 
the unemployment rate is not yet at crisis-level high (a peak of 5.8% in March 2003), nowadays young 
generations and unskilled workers stand much slimmer chance of getting secure and well-paid work.  As 
a consequence, income inequality has risen quickly and populations below the poverty line have surged 
as well.
As we can observe from Figure 1, the number of welfare claims moved simultaneously with the 
economy’s sluggishness to some extent.  For example, welfare claims shifted to an upward trend in 
1995, just a couple of years after the collapse of the bubble economy.  When the economy deteriorates, 
as with the most recent example of Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 2008, the number of welfare caseloads 
skyrocketed thereafter.  Meanwhile, when the economy recovered slightly during the period from 2002 
to 2007, welfare claims increased moderately.
If a sluggish economy is the major factor responsible for the climbing welfare claims, this rapid 
upward trend could be moderated or even reversed when the economic condition is improved.  Put 
differently, as long as the lost decades persist, the welfare dependency rate is likely to keep rising. 
B．Rapid Aging and Dysfunctional Public Pension System
Rapid aging, however, is another critical factor for welfare claims.  Japan outweighs all other nations 
with the highest proportion of elderly citizens, 23.1% over the age of 65 in 2010 (Source: Statistics 
Bureau, Japan).  Households headed by the elderly make up the biggest group of welfare collectors in 
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Japan.  As Table 1 indicates, more than 40% of the households on welfare are elderly households. 
Why are there so many elderly citizens collecting welfare despite the fact that Japan has a universal 
public pension system? The coverage of basic pension is universal, but a significant number of the self-
employed, farmers and non-employed, for whom subtracting pension premiums from pay checks is near 
impossible, are defaulting on premium payments, either because they are too present-orientated, in 
money shortage, or have no confidence in the public pension system (Suzuki and Zhou, 2001).  Since the 
eligibility for pension benefits requires a minimum of 25 years of premium payments, some of the 
defaulters are going to lose their entitlement to pension benefits.  While premium defaulting was rare in 
the 1970s and 1980s1） 1, the most recent default rate is as high as 40% (2009).  Put differently, we will 
see more and more non-pensioners in the future.  The welfare program is going to face an even bigger 
challenge when these present premium defaulters enter retirement.  
Table 1　Households’ Type on Welfare (2005‒2010)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total number of 1,041,508 1,075,820 1,105,275 1,148,766 1,274,231 1,409,067
households on welfare (3.3) (2.7) (3.9) (10.9) (10.6)
Elderly households 43.4% 44.0% 45.0% 45.6% 44.2% 42.8%
(4.8) (5.0) (5.3) (7.5) (7.1)
Households whose head 37.4% 36.9% 36.3% 35.4% 34.2% 33.0%
is disabled or in illness (1.9) (0.9) (1.5) (7.1) (6.7)
Single‒mother 8.7%  8.6%  8.4%  8.1%  7.8%  7.7%
households (2.3) (0.3) (0.5) (6.6) (9.2)
Other types of 10.3% 10.2% 10.1% 10.6% 13.5% 16.1%
households (2.4) (1.3) (9.2) (41.5) (32.2)
Sources: “Welfare Administration Report” by Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
Notes: (1)Number in the parentheses is the percent changes from previous year. (2)Monthly averaged values. (3)
Forecasted values for 2010. Data of the nuclear disaster‒affected Fukushima Prefecture (regions other than Koriyama 
City) is excluded from the statistics of 2011:02.
C．Government Stances on Welfare Approval
The stance of the government is another important but always neglected factor in determining welfare 
claims.  Criteria for approving or rejecting welfare applications are at least partly under the cloud of 
subjective judgment.  For example, the likelihood of a healthy, working-age poor man getting access to 
welfare could vary notably by his residence (wealthier municipalities are basically more generous), 
application skills and know-how, and luck.  The general stance of the government on welfare approval is 
not time-invariant, however.
Welfare administration is monitored by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), mainly 
through detailed notices and orders.  When outlining the major notices concerning welfare administration 
1） The default rate on national pension premiums was less than 5% in the 1970s.  Data source: Homepage of Pension 
Finance by Pension Bureau, Japan. 
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in the last two decades (Table 2), one can easily find swaying government stances on welfare approval. 
The years between 1998 and 2003 and between September 2008 and the present could be classified as 
“Eras of Generous Stance”, periods in which welfare applications of healthy working-age applicants 
were relatively easily approved.  The years between 2003 and 2008, however, could be classified as “Era 
of Tough Stance”, a period in which welfare approvals were relatively strict. 
What has led to such big changes in the government’s stance? Public criticism, regime change and 
anti-poverty social movements are very likely factors driving these changes.
(Era of Generous Stance: 1998-2003) There have been an increasing number of homeless people in 
urban Japan since the late 1990s, and the problem of their subsistence rights has been rising as a new 
social concern.  Although Japan’s welfare program traditionally turns down any applicants that have no 
settled residences, it was from then on that MHLW has instructed flexible treatment of homeless welfare 
applicants.  For example, some districts such as Tokyo and Osaka began to help the homeless people 
secure a residence, a prerequisite for welfare approval, either by subsidizing rental deposits or by directly 
providing free or cheap lodging houses.  As a result, the number of free or cheap lodging houses rose 
sharply in the Kanto area (Tokyo), and it became much easier for the homeless people to get access to 
welfare compared to before. 
(Era of Tough Stance: 2003-2008) Along with too rapid rises of welfare expenditures and the 
prevalence of bogus welfare claims, public criticism surged and the government turned to a new 
direction of curbing the welfare claims.  MHLW set up a welfare council named, “Experts Committee on 
the New Welfare Programs” in 2003 to discuss the revision of welfare law.  In December 2005, MHLW 
and local governments concluded an agreement on proper management of the welfare system.  Detailed 
stricter welfare approval criteria were directed to welfare agencies in March 2006, through a formal 
notice named “Handbook for proper management of the welfare system”.  In response to this change in 
stance, welfare agencies began strictly confining welfare applicants and some of the potential users were 
refused even at the consulting stage, a situation mocked by lawyers and welfare workers as the 
“Waterfront Strategy” (Mizugiwa Sakusen)2）. 
(Era of Generous Stance: September 2008-present) The government stance on welfare approvals 
returned to a generous one along with the Lehman crisis in September 2008.  At the end of 2008, to 
protest the massive dismissal of dispatched workers, anti-poverty activists set a New-Year Tent village 
for laid-off workers in Hibiya Park, a place right under the eyes of Japan’s political inner circle.  As the 
activities had intended, this action attracted intensive media and political attentions.  Under huge 
political pressure, welfare agencies approved many tent villagers to use welfare in the short term, many 
2） Under the Waterfront Strategy, some sorrowful incidents happened.  In July 2007, for example, a former welfare 
recipient of Kitakyushu City was found dead from hunger, leaving a message that “I want to eat rice ball” in their 
diary.  Two other similar deaths were found in Kitakyushu City in January 2005 and May 2006.
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of which lacked careful screening.  This generous stance was accelerated by the regime transition from 
the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in September 
2009.  After the regime transition, MHLW issued the notices “Improving welfare administration on poor 
persons under the urgent employment measures” (10/2009) and “Special attention on support for the 
jobless poor” (12/2009) to formally confirm this generous government stance.  
A direct outcome of the government stance of generous approval could be the steep rises of working-
age welfare recipients, and this worry has already turned partly into reality.  Table 1 discloses an 
unusually high two-digit increase of “other types of households” in two consecutive years (41.5% rises 
in 2009 and 32.2% rises in 2010).  Since the elderly, those with disabilities or illness and single-mother 
households have already been excluded from the definition of “other types of households”, we can safely 
declare that welfare claims among healthy working-age men has been increasing at an incredibly high 
pace in recent years.
In sum, the sluggish economy, population aging as well as government stances are all telling and only 
telling part of the story about exploding welfare claims in Japan.  In this paper, we assume the sluggish 
economy to be a “temporary or business-cycle factor”, because the economic condition will inevitably 
improve at some point, no matter how many years it takes.  On the other hand, both the population aging 
and government stances are assumed to be “permanent or structural factors” because their effects are 
long-lasting and are hard to reverse in the short run. 
Table 2　Major Policy Events Concerning with Welfare Adminstration (1998‒present)
Background Policy Shifts (Major Notices)
1998‒2003 Increasing number of the homeless and Upward 
social concerns. Welfare approval to the homeless 
get much easier.
Expanding policy supports to the homeless to 
secure a residence, which is a prerequisite for 
getting welfare approval.
2003‒2008 Criticism of exploding welfare caseloads. Strict 
eyes on bogus claims of welfare and tighter 
welfare approval
MHLW notice “Handbook for proper management 
of welfare system” (03/2006)
MHLW notice “Actions against misuses of welfare 
by Yakuza” (03/2006)
09/2008 Lehman shock‒Massive Dismissing of dispatched workers
2008‒2009 New‒Year Tent village for laid‒off workers in 
Hibiya Park, run by anti‒poverty activists, attracted 
intensive media attention (12/2008‒01/2009)
MHLW notice “Positive actions against the 
declining job market” (12/2008)
A surging social and political pressures on more 
generous welfare approval
MHLW notice “Intensive support for laid‒off and 
homeless persons” (03/2009)
09/2009 Change of Regime from the LDP to the Democratic Party
2009‒present Further Generosity on welfare approval under 
Demoratic Party administration
MHLW notice “Improving Welfare administration 
on poor persons under the Urgent Employment 
Measures” (10/2009)
MHLW notice “Special attention on support for the 
jobless poor” (12/2009)
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Ⅲ．Decomposing the Shifts of Welfare Claims
While both the “temporary factor” and “permanent factor” are affecting welfare claims to some extent, 
it is important to understand which factor imposes a relatively larger shock on the climbing welfare 
dependency for the reasons we mentioned earlier.  In order to verify the relative importance of each 
factor, we tried to decompose the shifts of welfare claims into two parts: (1) changes due to permanent 
shock and (2) changes due to temporary shock.  Here, the number of welfare claims per 1,000 persons, 
which we call “public assistance rate”, is our analysis target. 
A．Method of Blanchard-Quah Decomposition3）
Using a bivariate VAR (BVAR), Blanchard and Quah (1989) propose a smart way to decompose real 
GNP into its temporary and permanent components.  To take our study as an example, suppose we are 
interested in decomposing the sequence of the public assistance rate, say {yt}, into its temporary and 
permanent components.  In a univariate framework, there is no unique way to perform the 
decomposition.  Blanchard and Quah (1989), however, suggest to introduce a second variable, say 
unemployment rate {zt} in our case, that is affected by the same two shocks.  If we ignore the intercept 
terms, the bivariate vector moving average (BVMA) of the {yt} and {zt} sequences will have the 
following form: 
k???yt ? c11 ε1t?k?
k?0
∞
k???c12 ε2t?k
k?0
∞
 (1)
k???zt ? c21 ε1t?k?
k?0
∞
k???c22 ε2t?k
k?0
∞
 (2)
where ε1t and ε2t are independent white-noise disturbances, each having a constant variance of 1.  cij(k) 
are the individual coefficients of the polynomials where k denotes lag operator. 
The key to decomposing the {yt} sequence into its trend and irregular components is to assume that 
one of the shocks ε1t has only a temporary effect on the {yt} sequence.  In the long run, if the public 
assistance rate is to be unaffected by the ε1t shock, the accumulated effect of an ε1t shock on the {yt} 
sequence must be equal to zero.  Hence, the coefficients c11(k) in equation (1) must be such that 
k??? ???c11
k?0
∞
 (3)
Although the permanent and temporary shocks are not observed, the problem could be cleared up by 
using a BVAR estimation.  Given both the {yt} and {zt} sequences as stationary, there exists a VAR 
3） Description of the Blanchard-Quah decomposition method is from Suzuki and Zhou (2007).
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representation for equations (1) and (2) as follows. 
l???yt ? a11 yt?l? ?
l?0
p
l???a12 zt?l e1t
l?0
p
 (4)
l???zt ? a21 yt?l? ?
l?0
p
l???a22 zt?l e2t
l?0
p
 (5)
where aij(l) are the individual coefficients and l denotes lag operator.  Blanchard and Quah (1989) find 
that the VAR residual of e1t and e2t are composites of the pure innovations ε1t and ε1t.  That is, 
0???e1t ? ?c11 ε1t 0???c12 ε2t (6)
0???e2t ? ?c21 ε1t 0???c22 ε2t (7)
Since the values of e1t and e2t can be easily obtained by BVAR estimations, it would be possible to 
recover the values of ε1t and ε1t if only we know the values of c11(0), c12(0), c21(0), c22(0).  Blanchard and 
Quah show that the BVMA model plus equations (3), (6), and (7) provide exactly four restrictions that 
can be used to identify these four coefficients.  Hence, by substituting the estimates into the following 
two equations, we can obtain the values of temporary and permanent shocks to the public assistance rate 
shift. 
 
(Temporary shock)　　　 k???yTt ? c11 ε1t?k
k?0
∞
 (8)
(Permanent shock)　　　ypt ? k???c12 ε2t?k
k?0
∞
 (9)
Finally, by using the estimation results of equations (1) and (2), we will then be able to estimate the 
impulse response function, decompose the forecast error variance of public assistance rate, and perform 
historical decomposition on the public assistance rate. 
B．Make a Check of the Data 
Before turning to the decomposition results, we make a comparison between the two sequences of our 
concern-public assistance rate and unemployment rate.  The monthly nationwide data over the period 
April 1960 to March 2010 (N=600) are used.  Possibly because these two sequences have diverse 
trends4）, the original sequence of the public assistance rate seems to have an inverse movement with that 
of unemployment rate (Figure 2). 
4） Due to the economic growth and the accumulation of national wealth, the public assistance rate has a downward trend 
in the long run.  The unemployment rate, on the other hand, has an upward trend in the long run because mismatch 
unemployment has increased substantially along with radical technology innovation and industry structure transitions. 
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After getting rid of the trend by using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators, however, we find a 
similar movement between these two sequences.  While additionally controlling the effect of structural 
change of the economy around the first oil shock in 19745）, we still find a concurrent movement between 
the sequences of the public assistance rate and unemployment rate (Figure 3).  Hence, the unemployment 
rate should be regarded as an appropriate variable for Blanchard and Quah decomposition.  In 
estimations of the BVAR, stationary sequences after controls of time trend and oil shock break are used, 
5） Public assistance rate=12.12865–0.0043507*trend+3.533062*Oil shock dummy
　　　　　(38.43)　(–5.66)　　　　　(11.55)　　　　　 　　　Adj R-squared= 0.5149
 Unemployment= 0.3017669+0.0074976*trend+0.340172* Oil shock dummy 
　　　　　　　　　(3.60)　　　　　(36.79)　　　　(4.19)　　Adj R-squared= 0.8192
Notes: (1) t-values are in parentheses.  (2) Oil shock dummy equals 1 if before December 1973; 0 otherwise.
Figure 2　Monthly Shifts of Unemployment Rate and Public Assistance Rate
 (Original Sequences, 1960:04-2011:03)　　　　　　　
Figure 3　Monthly Shifts of Unemployment Rate and Public Assistance Rate 
　　(Stationary sequences with time trend & oil shock break removed, 1960:04-2011:03)
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as shown by the plots of Figure 3.
C．Forecast Error Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Estimates
Using monthly data over the period April 1960 through March 2011, we estimate the BVAR model 
with 12-month lags6） (Table 3).  To be noted, we treat the month dummies as exogenous deterministic 
regressors when performing the BVAR estimation because the original sequences are seasonal.
The forecast error variances of the public assistance rate obtained from the above BVAR estimation 
are decomposed into two parts: those due to permanent and those due to temporary shocks (Table 4).  We 
find that permanent shocks play a central role not only in the long run but also in the short run, which is 
a major difference from this paper and Suzuki and Zhou (2007). 
Using an older and shorter time series sequence (1960:4-2006:10), Suzuki and Zhou (2007) find that 
temporary shock accounts for a dominant percentage of the public assistance rate variance in the short-
run (e. g., 85.4% at 12 months) and gradually fades in the long-run horizon.  This paper, however, 
indicates that permanent shock dominates even at the very initial horizon.  For example, permanent 
shock is responsible for 82.5% of the variance of the public assistance rate at the 1-month horizon and 
its weight reaches 94.6% at 120 months (Table 4).  The increasing role of permanent shock indicates that 
there could be some structural changes that arose during the newly added five years (2006:11-2011:03).
Turning to estimations of the impulse response function on public assistance rate, Figure 4 indicates 
that the impulse of temporary shock fades gradually with time.  The impulse of permanent shocks, on the 
other hand, steadily rises up as the forecasting horizon grows.  Still, it takes 64 months for the impulse of 
temporary shock to converge to zero.  Put differently, even if the public assistance rate rises due to 
temporary shocks, e. g. a recession or an earthquake, it takes nearly 5 years to regain the normal level7）. 
Why does the temporary shock keep its influence for such a long time? Like many other advanced 
nations, Japan’s welfare program takes the form of guaranteed monthly income, under which the welfare 
agency determines the income needed for an eligible person based on family size and area living costs. 
If there are any earnings obtained, a large part of it will be subtracted from this needed level8）.  Welfare 
recipients are then inclined to stay in the welfare program rather than work outside even after the initial 
temporary shock has ended for a long time, a situation which we call “poverty trap”.  Since Japan has no 
US-style lifetime cap on welfare, the work disincentive of the welfare program could be huge.
6） Estimation result by using 24-month lags is basically the same with the case of using 12-month lags.
7） Suzuki and Zhou (2007) estimate that a much longer period (105 months) is needed for temporary shock to converge 
to zero.  Since our approaches are the same, the gap is likely be formed by the difference in sequence length. 
8） Japanʼs welfare program permits very little “earned income retained”.  According to the estimates of Hashimoto (2006), 
on average 83-93% of the earned income is balanced out.  Put differently, if a welfare receiver earns 100 yen, only 7 
to 17 yen will be his or her net income on hand.  See Abe (2008) for a detailed discussion about the work disincentive 
problem of Japanʼs welfare program.
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Table 3　Estimation Result of the BVAR Model
Dependent variables (Y): (1)Public Assistance Rate (2)Unemployment Rate
Coeff. S.E. p value Coeff. S.E. p value
Public Assistance Rate{1} 1.012 23.636 0.000 0.077 0.037 0.039
Public Assistance Rate{2} 0.016 0.261 0.794 −0.106 0.053 0.045
Public Assistance Rate{3} 0.037 0.612 0.541 0.009 0.053 0.865
Public Assistance Rate{4} −0.032 −0.525 0.599 0.013 0.052 0.809
Public Assistance Rate{5} −0.001 −0.020 0.984 0.028 0.052 0.597
Public Assistance Rate{6} −0.003 −0.056 0.956 −0.061 0.052 0.245
Public Assistance Rate{7} −0.016 −0.267 0.790 0.092 0.052 0.080
Public Assistance Rate{8} 0.014 0.239 0.811 −0.079 0.052 0.131
Public Assistance Rate{9} 0.090 1.489 0.137 0.099 0.053 0.060
Public Assistance Rate{10} −0.078 −1.278 0.202 −0.073 0.053 0.165
Public Assistance Rate{11} 0.000 0.007 0.995 0.084 0.053 0.111
Public Assistance Rate{12} −0.042 −0.977 0.329 −0.089 0.037 0.018
Unemployment Rate{1} 0.039 0.787 0.432 0.835 0.043 0.000
Unemployment Rate{2} −0.009 −0.139 0.890 −0.012 0.055 0.833
Unemployment Rate{3} −0.041 −0.637 0.525 0.085 0.055 0.126
Unemployment Rate{4} 0.050 0.777 0.438 0.021 0.055 0.698
Unemployment Rate{5} −0.074 −1.162 0.246 −0.007 0.055 0.903
Unemployment Rate{6} 0.015 0.232 0.816 0.098 0.055 0.074
Unemployment Rate{7} 0.071 1.115 0.265 −0.075 0.055 0.171
Unemployment Rate{8} −0.022 −0.343 0.732 −0.027 0.055 0.630
Unemployment Rate{9} −0.005 −0.074 0.941 −0.022 0.055 0.695
Unemployment Rate{10} −0.082 −1.286 0.199 −0.005 0.055 0.925
Unemployment Rate{11} 0.044 0.691 0.490 0.042 0.055 0.444
Unemployment Rate{12} 0.028 0.562 0.574 0.042 0.043 0.321
Constant 0.120 2.484 0.013 0.345 0.042 0.000
February dummy −0.102 −2.449 0.015 −0.211 0.036 0.000
March Dummy −0.065 −1.523 0.128 −0.042 0.037 0.259
April Dummy −0.238 −5.458 0.000 −0.446 0.038 0.000
May Dummy −0.139 −3.214 0.001 −0.374 0.037 0.000
June Dummy −0.086 −2.143 0.033 −0.379 0.035 0.000
July Dummy −0.080 −1.935 0.054 −0.359 0.036 0.000
August Dummy −0.101 −2.355 0.019 −0.246 0.037 0.000
September Dummy −0.134 −2.923 0.004 −0.285 0.040 0.000
October Dummy −0.106 −2.246 0.025 −0.291 0.041 0.000
November Dummy −0.083 −2.028 0.043 −0.288 0.035 0.000
December Dummy −0.046 −1.142 0.254 −0.326 0.035 0.000
N 600 600
Std Error of Y 2.151 0.561
Note: Sequences after controls for time trend and oil shock break are used.
128
D．Historical Decomposition on Recent Rapid Rises of Public Assistance Rate
After decomposing the forecast error variance into temporary and permanent shocks throughout the 
whole estimation period, we then turn to another important issue: How should the rapid rises of welfare 
claims in recently years be understood?
“Historical decomposition” serves the goals of verifying the relative importance of permanent and 
temporary shocks within a limited period.  Since April 1992 is the most recent bottom point of the 
welfare assistance rate (Figure 1), we choose the recent 228-month sequence (1992:04-2011:03) as the 
target of historical decomposition. 
The approach is simple.  First, we estimate a BVAR model by using the previous sequence (1960:04-
1992:03).  Second, using the BVAR estimates, we forecast the values of the public assistance rate of our 
concerned sequence (1992:04-2011:03) through dynamic simulations.  Third, we compute the gap 
between the real and forecasted values of the public assistance rate in regard to our concerned sequence 
Table 4　Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Public Assistance Rate
Horizon
(Months)
Standard Err. Percentage of variance due to 
permanent shock
Percentage of variance due to 
Temporary shock
1 0.15 82.5 17.5
6 0.41 85.1 14.9
12 0.65 85.4 14.6
24 1.08 86.5 13.5
36 1.43 88.1 11.9
48 1.71 89.7 10.4
60 1.94 91.0 9.0
84 2.31 92.9 7.1
120 2.67 94.6 5.4
Figure 4　Impulse Response Function Estimates on Public Assistance Rate
Note: The impulse being imposed is one standard error shock.
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(Figure 5).  This gap is the part of changes that could not be explained by previous information and is 
likely born solely from the exogenous shocks that emerged since April 1992.  Finally, we decompose this 
gap into permanent and temporary components (Figure 6). 
Figure 5 demonstrates the gap between baseline forecasts and real values of the public assistance rate 
during the period from April 1992 to March 2011.  The real values of the public assistance rate after 
removing the time trend and oil shock break rose drastically, from 9.1‰ to 18.5‰ (9.4‰ points up). 
The baseline forecasts of the public assistance rate, however, rise only 3.1‰ points.  There is left a 
forecast-real gap of as large as 6.3‰ points.  Worth mentioning is that nearly half (45.2%) of the gap 
was created after the Lehman crisis.  Thus, the unexpected rapid rises of the public assistance rate within 
the past 19 years are mainly due to exogenous and unexpected shocks that emerged after 2008. 
Looking deeper into the components of the gap, the result of the historical decomposition (Figure 6) 
indicates that permanent shock plays a particularly important role in enlarging the forecast-real gap after 
2008.  Permanent shock accounts for only 52.0% of the forecast-real gap at the beginning of the Lehman 
shock (September 2008), but its share reaches as high as 82.3% in April 2011.  Dating back to the pre-
Lehman period, we find that the power of permanent shock has once experienced rapid expansion 
between 1998 and 2002.  The expansion was temporarily interrupted by the mildly recovering economy, 
a good time (2003-2007) termed “Izanagi Keiki”.  And then, it came back, with even stronger power. 
However, as a whole, permanent shock imposes a continuously positive impact on the public assistance 
rate and should be regarded as the main driving factor of the upward shift of the public assistance rate.
Although the temporary shock is not responsible for the quantitative upward shift of the public 
assistance rate, it did work as a driving force for the rises of welfare claims in recent years 
Figure 5　Gap between Real Values and Baseline Forecasts of Public Assistance Rate
(April 1992-March 2011)　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
Note: Sequences after controls for time trend and oil shock break are used.
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(2005-present).  Figure 6 also indicates that there exists a time lag between business cycle and public 
assistance rate.  For example, the Japanese economy has been turning toward recovery since 2003, but 
the temporary shock keeps imposing a positive impact on the public assistance rate.  This lag arose 
because even with the economy recovering, the present public assistance recipients may need some time 
to search for new jobs before they stop using welfare.  On the other hand, even if the economy is 
entering a recession and the unemployment rate is rising, the new jobless may not immediately turn to 
welfare use because they possibly have savings or unemployment insurance benefits.
Ⅳ．Discussions: How to Interpret Permanent Shock
How can we interpret this strengthened role of permanent shock? Shall we interpret it as the result of 
population aging? Or, shall we regard it as an outcome of changing government stance upon welfare 
approvals? Possibly both, but we suspect that the government stance factor could represent a larger 
source of the permanent shock in recent years.
It should be remembered that aging only moves forward and steadily, while government stance swings 
forward and backward, as we mentioned earlier.  If aging presents the permanent shock, the influence of 
the permanent shock should be accumulated steadily upon the whole span.  In fact, however, the 
expansion of the permanent shock is far from being steady and was obviously interrupted between 2003 
and 2007 (see Figure 6).  Instead, we find a linked movement with government stance and the strength of 
permanent shock (See Table 5). 
Figure 6　Historical Decomposition on the Forecast-Real Gap of Public Assistance Rate 
(April 1992-March 2011)　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
Note: Sequences after controls for time trend and oil shock break are used.
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It was around 2003 that many public opinions in Japan were criticizing the overuse of welfare, and it 
was from then that MHLW began to instruct the welfare agencies to exercise stricter oversight on 
welfare approvals.  The return to greater welfare use in 2008 is accompanied by a surge of political 
pressure from anti-poverty movements, and this was further enhanced by the transition of regime from 
the conservative LDP to liberal DPJ.  It is not so hard to find that the influence of permanent shock 
strengthened (or weakened) in parallel with the generous (or tough) government stance toward welfare 
approvals.
Although we suspect government stance represents a larger source of the permanent shock for the 
above reason, our conclusion is tentative.  As the above table shows, THE impact of permanent shock 
also varies simultaneously with economic condition: being strengthened in recession and being 
weakened in boom.  Hence, a more likely flow could be as represented in the following chart.
Bad economy → Antipoverty movement, political pressures → Generous government stance
Larger impact of permanent shock ← Rapid increases of welfare claims?
No matter whether it is the bad economy that triggered a generous government stance or not, as long 
as the government stance on welfare approvals stays as it is now, the public assistance rate is going to 
keep rising at a high pace in the coming future. 
However, to what extent can Japanese nationals afford the heavy burden of welfare programs? The 
total expenditure on the welfare program has already exceeded 3 trillion yen in 2010, which is nearly 
double the size compared to one decade ago.  If this trend prevails in the coming two decades, the annual 
expenditures on welfare programs is likely to reach 10 trillion yen, a figure big enough to spur a 
bankruptcy of the government.  In order to maintain a fiscally stable and sound welfare system in the 
future, MHLW may need to develop a stricter stance on approvals even in a bad economy. 
Ⅴ．Concluding Remarks
Separating the shocks on welfare claims into permanent and temporary parts is challenging because of 
the complicated technique.  Interpreting the permanent shock, however, is an even more difficult task. 
As such, very few studies provide a definite separation on these two shocks.  Nonetheless, this paper has 
confirmed the increasing power of permanent shock through estimates, and for the first time, points out 
that the government’s generous stances upon welfare approvals could play an important role in driving 
Table 5　Linked Movements between Government Stance and Permanent Shock
Influence of 
Permanent Shock
Aging Economy Government Stance
1998‒2002 Strengthened Proceed Steadily Recession Generous
2003‒2007 Weakened Proceed Steadily Mild Boom Tough
2008‒present Strengthened Proceed Steadily Recession Generous
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up welfare claims in recent years. 
Anti-poverty is definitely an important policy target for any government.  Allowing many healthy, 
working-age poor to live on welfare, however, cannot be justified.  According to the projection of 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan’s old-age dependency ratio is going 
to increase from the current 26% to the 50% range in 2030.  Japan obviously cannot afford letting more 
and more precious workable citizens turn from the “supporting groups” to the “supported groups”.  The 
proper way to help the working-age poor is not to provide easy welfare, but to encourage them to search 
for new jobs either through tax credits or by providing job search assistance and free vocational training. 
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